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BOOK REVIEW
TOO BIG TO FAIL, TOO BLIND TO SEE
Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-
AND THEMSELVES. By Andrew Ross Sorkin. New York: Viking.
2009. Pp. 624. $32.95.
Reviewed by Tom C W Lin*
"We just hit the iceberg. The boat is filling with water, and
the music is still playing. There aren't enough lifeboats.
[Someone is going to die.]"
- Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan, on the eve of Lehman
Brothers' bankruptcy.1
INTRODUCTION
The sky was falling in 2008. In March, investment bank
Bear Stearns, having been founded in 1923 and survived the
Great Depression, was sold for $2 a share to JP Morgan in a
government-backed fire sale (p. 37). That September, the world
witnessed the bankruptcy filing of the venerable investment
bank Lehman Brothers and the largest point-drop in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average's history.2 The New York Times re-
porter, Andrew Ross Sorkin, in his book, Too Big to Fail, chron-
icles the fall of these financial institutions and the economic
crisis that enveloped the world during this tumultuous period
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thanks
to Alexander Statsky for research assistance, and to the University of Florida Levin
College of Law for its research support.
1 P. 336.
2 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
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from the ultimate insider's perspective of key executives, public
officials, attorneys, and regulators.
In the burgeoning market of books that chronicle the
events of the recent financial crisis,3 Too Big to Fail stands out
for its sheer size (coming in at 624 pages and 2.1 pounds) and
its meticulous insiders' account of crucial meetings, decisions,
and (even) thoughts of key players. According to Sorkin, his
tome is a "product of more than five hundred hours of inter-
views with more than two hundred individuals who partici-
pated directly in the events surrounding the financial crisis" (p.
xi). Sorkin's well-sourced narrative paints a tale that places the
reader in important meetings, critical conference calls, and
sometimes, into the minds of key principals-often revealing
the profound, the private, and occasionally, the petty. The book
reveals a secret ethics waiver obtained by then Treasury Secre-
tary Hank Paulson, which allowed him to participate in discus-
sions with his former employer, Goldman Sachs (p. 424).4 The
reader also learns that Paulson said, "[t]hat makes me want to
vomit!," upon hearing that JP Morgan was elevating the pur-
chase price of Bear Stearns from $2 to $10 (p. 36), and that he
actually vomited in his office from stress and exhaustion dur-
ing the height of the crisis (p. 468).
For attorneys, legislators, and regulators, the book high-
lights the inadequacy of the current regulatory apparatus to
handle a modern financial crisis. The banking and securities
rules of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's are simply not meant for
See, e.g., GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE BEHIND-THE-
SCENES STORY OF How JOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL
HISTORY (2009); HENRY M. PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF
WALL STREET (2010); WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND
WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET (2009); LAWRENCE G. McDONALD & PATRICK
ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS (2009); GILLIAN TETI', FOOL'S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD
DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED
AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2010); KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72
HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET (2009).
4 An image of the waiver is included in the pictorial inserts in the middle of the
book; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paulson's Secret Waiver to Work on Goldman Mat-
ters, Oct. 19, 2008, available at http://www.andrewrosssorkin.com/?p=174.
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a world created by what Sorkin calls "American-style financial
engineering" (p. 3), with complex securities instruments mar-
keted by uber-interconnected financial institutions that serve
as financial wholesalers and supermarkets to each other and
the masses. At various points in the book, we see the ad hoc
approaches that regulators concocted in order to put out simul-
taneous fires because they lacked proper regulatory tools.5 Cur-
rent Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, then New York
Federal Reserve President, encouraged bank mergers of vari-
ous permutations to stave off a financial collapse; his persis-
tence led some CEOs to refer to him as 'eHarmony,' after the
online dating service" (p. 480).
Too Big to Fail offers a meticulous re-telling of one of the
most important periods in recent history. As regulators, bank-
ers, lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties sift through
the rubble in search of knowledge about the crash, Too Big to
Fail serves both as a chronicle of the recent past and a cautio-
nary tale for the immediate future. Acknowledging past mis-
steps, uncovering root causes, and correcting systemic short-
comings to prevent similar failure is arguably the key economic
and regulatory challenge of our time.
Part I of this Essay summarizes key episodes of the finan-
cial crisis as covered by Too Big to Fail. Part II examines a po-
tential explanation of the crisis unexplored in the book in light
of the decline of neoclassical economic theory and the emer-
gence of behavioral economic theory. Finally, this Essay closes
with a brief conclusion.
5 Nearly two years following the maelstrom of the financial crisis, Congress passed
landmark financial regulatory reform legislation aimed at providing more tools to
regulators to prevent and to manage similar crises in the future. See, e.g., Helene
Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul ofFinancial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3
(reporting on the expansion of federal regulatory powers in the new financial reform
law); Edward Wyatt & David M. Herszenhorn, In Deal, New Authority Over Wall
Street, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at Al ("The final bill vastly expands the regulatory
powers of the Federal Reserve and establishes a systemic risk council of high-ranking
officials, led by the Treasury secretary, to detect potential threats to the overall finan-
cial system."); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l1l1cong.bills&docid=f:h41 73enr.txt.pdf.
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I. THE CHRONICLES OF A CRASH AND RESCUE(S)
According to Sorkin, Too Big to Fail is structured like the
2004 Oscar-winning movie Crash, consisting of several see-
mingly independent storylines-the forced closeout sale of Bear
Stearns, the precipitous failure of Lehman Brothers, and the
colossal collapse of AIG-that form a collective narrative about
a financial system (and the world) pushed to the brink.6 The
book opens in the Park Avenue apartment of JP Morgan CEO,
Jamie Dimon, on September 13, 2008, with Lehman treading
the thin line between rescue and ruin. Dimon summons his
brain trust on a conference call and warns them "to prepare
right now for Lehman Brothers filing . . . [a]nd for Merrill
Lynch filing ... [a]nd for AIG filing . .. [a]nd for Morgan Stan-
ley filing . .. [aInd potentially for Goldman Sachs filing" (p. 3).
In doing so, Dimon was essentially commanding his senior ex-
ecutives to prepare for financial Armageddon. With that brief
prologue, Sorkin begins his detailed chronicle of the crash and
rescue(s) of the financial system.
The End of Bear Stearns
The end of Bear Stearns, in March of 2008, sent shock
waves through the financial system, many of which continued
to be felt for years after. Based on Sorkin's reporting, we dis-
cover that then Treasury Secretary Paulson was personally and
secretly behind the "original paltry sale price" of $2 per share
(p. 37). JP Morgan's purchase of Bear required a government
backstop of $29 billion, for which "Paulson did not want to be
seen as a patsy, bailing out his friends on Wall Street," so he
insisted on a very low, nominal price (p. 37). Much to the cha-
grin and disgust of Paulson, Dimon would ultimately elevate
the $2 price to $10 in order to secure a smooth shareholder ap-
6 See Gabriel Sherman, The Information Broker, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Nov. 8,
2009 ("The structure of Too Big to Fail is 'modeled almost shamelessly on the movie
Crash,' Sorkin says. 'I thought you could sort of structure each of these various story
lines, which seemed to be happening in this almost autonomous, semi-independent
way, sort of like Crash does. And of course as the story progresses, they cataclysmically
come together and you start seeing the connections between things."').
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proval vote. Dimon, in congressional testimony, compared the
purchase of Bear Stearns to "buying a house on fire" (p. 71).
The rescue of Bear by the government was necessitated by
the lack of tools in the federal regulatory apparatus. Because
Bear was a pure investment bank, the Federal Reserve and
Treasury had limited means to provide direct assistance. As a
result, the Federal Reserve had to work through a regulated
bank, like JP Morgan, which had a major commercial banking
arm, in order to save Bear. This lack of regulatory authority
becomes a recurring theme during the financial crisis, as gov-
ernment officials continuously struggled to fend off massive
failure with limited resources, and more troublingly, a limited
legislative mandate.
The Fall of Lehman Brothers
With the specter of Bear's death looming large in the
spring of 2008, senior executives at Lehman Brothers and the
federal government attempted to stave off another shock to the
financial system by stabilizing Lehman. Dick Fuld, the then
longtime CEO of Lehman, made various attempts at capitaliza-
tion as institutional clients made runs at the bank and the
market battered the stock in the wake of the subprime mort-
gage crisis. Fuld and senior federal officials discussed possible
deals with Bank of America, Barclays, Warren Buffett, Morgan
Stanley, and the Korean Development Bank.7 In the book, Sor-
kin portrays Fuld as an intensely hard-charging executive bent
on fighting back the rising tide against his firm, often to the
detriment of his cause. Fuld was convinced that his firm was
on solid ground, that market sanity would return, and that
Lehman would weather this storm. "They'd survive, he told
himself. They always did' (p. 12). Fuld's confidence, and bunk-
er mentality, perhaps inadvertently forced him to sabotage a
7 See Eric Dash, 5 Days of Pressure, Fear and Ultimately, Failure, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2008 ("Fuld redoubled efforts to execute his plan to sell parts of the firm. The
once unthinkable notion of selling Lehman in its entirety was also put on the table . . .
[and when Lehman] shares plunged to a bargain-basement price below $4, potential
suitors came out of hiding, including Barclays of Britain and Bank of America.").
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deal with the Korean Development Bank at the eleventh hour
by insisting on renegotiating a material term (pp. 215-16).
As the fall of Lehman seemed imminent, Fuld came off as
a paranoid and stubborn man who refused to accept the hard
truth about the coming financial tsunami and continued to in-
sist that his empire was simply being attacked by malicious
rumors and short-sellers. "The shorts! The shorts!," Fuld bel-
lowed. "That's what's happening here!" (p. 14). In the end, Fuld
lost sympathy from both his peers and government officials,
who also came to believe that he had no credibility. In meeting
with the heads of the major banks to save Lehman, Paulson
declared, "Dick is in no condition to make any decisions.... He
is in denial" (p. 303). On September 15, 2008, after much effort,
but no success by both public and private actors, Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy.8 It was the largest bankruptcy of
all time, with assets totaling over $600 billion. 9 The Dow
dropped over 500 points that day.10
The Shotgun Merger of Bank ofAmerica/Merrill Lynch
As Wall Street and Washington worked feverishly to stave
off the bankruptcy of Lehman, many sensed that the next do-
mino to fall would be Merrill Lynch. Greg Fleming, the Presi-
dent and COO of Merrill, and John Thain, the new CEO, knew
that they were the financial tsunami's next target as they
scrambled to find capital to stabilize their firm. "If Lehman was
swallowed up, there would be a run on the next biggest broker-
dealer-and that was his [Thain's] firm. Merrill Lynch, per-
haps the most iconic investment bank in the nation, was on the
brink of ruin" (p. 310). With their very existence at risk, Mer-
rill's senior executives turned to Morgan Stanley and Bank of
8 See Sorkin, supra note 2 (talking about how Lehman filed for bankruptcy); see
also Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks
Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al.
9 See Sam Mamudi, Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt, MARKETWATCH,
Sept. 15, 2008 ("Lehman Brothers Holdings is closing its doors with more than $600
billion of debt-the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history.").
10 See Stephen Labaton, Wall St. in Worst Loss Since '01 Despite Reassurances by
Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at Al ("By the end of the day, the Dow Jones indus-
trial average had dropped 504.48 points.").
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America for a capital infusion. Once a deal with Morgan Stan-
ley became unfeasible, Merrill turned its attention to Bank of
America.
According to Sorkin's astute reporting, unbeknownst to
Thain and Fleming, Bank of America had attempted to pur-
chase Merrill the year before, without success, in a seller's
market (p. 314). Now, the tide had changed, and it was a buy-
er's market and Bank of America was one of only a few poten-
tial buyers. While Merrill was only looking to sell a percentage
of itself, Bank of America was looking to buy the whole compa-
ny. With very little leverage and even less time, the Merrill
team was able to convince Bank of America to make the pur-
chase at a significant premium and fund its bonus pool with
government support (p. 359).11 Given the ethnography of the
firms, many were surprised by their marriage. "Merrill Lynch,
with a history of nearly one hundred years as one of the most
storied names on Wall Street, would be sold to Bank of America
for the biggest premium in the history of banking mergers. It
was. . . as if Wal-Mart were buying Tiffany's" (p. 359).
The Bank of America-Merrill Lynch deal was done in such
haste and under such pressure that more than a year after the
merger, regulators, legislators, and shareholder advocates con-
tinue to examine the steps and missteps that led to the shotgun
marriage. As of this writing, Ken Lewis and John Thain, the
respective CEOs of Bank of America and Merrill, are no longer
with the merged firm, and lawsuits and investigations relating
to the merger persist.12
11 See generally Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
12 See, e.g., In re Bank of America Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 09 MDL 2058 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 5, 2010, at Al ("Former Bank of America Corp. Chief Executive Kenneth D. Lewis
and the company's current consumer-banking chief were accused in a civil complaint of
duping investors by failing to disclose mounting losses at Merrill Lynch & Co. before
shareholders approved the securities firm's takeover by the giant bank."); Stephen
Majors, Bank of America Hid Losses, Lawsuit Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2009, at
A15 ("Bank of America executives improperly concealed billions of dollars in losses and
billions in bonuses paid by Merrill Lynch before a shareholder vote on their proposed
merger, Ohio's attorney general argued in a class-action securities lawsuit he described
as among the largest in history.").
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The Survival ofMorgan Stanley & Goldman Sachs
Following the merger of Bank of America and Merrill
Lynch, Wall Street shifted its focus to the last two pure in-
vestment banks-Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. Accord-
ing to Too Big to Fail, Morgan Stanley sought capital from var-
ious sources, including the Chinese and Japanese, and contem-
plated merging with Citigroup, Wachovia, or JP Morgan among
others (pp. 411, 415-16, 462-63, 478). Despite heavy pressure
from the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to
merge with another institution at a steep discount, John Mack
refused to cower to the pressure and decided to seek another
path to survival (p. 481). After intense negotiations, Mack was
able to secure a $9 billion capital infusion from the Japanese
bank, Mitsubishi. In a final twist of drama, the deal was set to
close on Columbus Day, when banks in America and Japan
were closed, so a wire transfer was not possible (p. 513). To fa-
cilitate the closing on an intercontinental bank holiday, a check
was written-a check that read: "Pay Against this Check to the
Order of Morgan Stanley. $9,000,000,000.00" (p. 518).13
Goldman Sachs, the widely held top investment bank of
Wall Street, like Morgan Stanley, faced similar market and
regulatory pressures. It was in need of a significant capital in-
fusion at a time when funds were extremely scarce. Treasury
officials initially pushed Goldman to merge with Wachovia, but
subsequently declined to support the deal because of the public
relations concerns stemming from the fact that many of the
interested parties had significant ties to Goldman. As Warren
Buffett succinctly put it:
By tonight the government will realize they can't provide cap-
ital to a deal that's being done by the firm of the former Trea-
sury secretary with the company of a retired vice chairman of
13 An image of the $9 billion check that saved Morgan Stanley is included in the
pictorial inserts in the middle of the book; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Morgan Stan-
ley's $9,000,000,000.00 Check. That's $9 Billion!, Nov. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.andrewrosssorkin.comPp=355.
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Goldman Sachs .... They'll all wake up and realize even if it
was the best deal in the world, they can't do it.14
Goldman ultimately secured $5 billion of funding through
Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway by giving Buffett a very gener-
ous deal in exchange for the capital and the oracle's imprima-
tur.15
In late September 2008, amid all the deal-making, both
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs-the last two independent
investment banks-announced that they were becoming bank
holding companies in order to gain access to more federal funds
in exchange for greater regulatory oversight. 16 It was the end of
a gilded era on Wall Street.
The Rescue ofAIG (and Everyone Else)
Even as the individual institutions found remedies to their
serious ills, the financial system as a whole remained at risk. A
holistic remedy was needed for the financial system, and part
of that remedy involved curing an institution that was not even
an investment bank, but an insurance company-American
International Group (AIG). For many years prior to the finan-
cial crisis, a unit of AIG sold credit default swaps, a form of
"insurance" for bonds.17 Investment banks would buy these
swaps in order to hedge their holdings in the event of a bond
default, in which case AIG would redeem the swap like an in-
surance payout. The banks purchased hundreds of billions of
dollars of swaps as insurance, which incidentally was great for
14 P. 473.
15 See generally Susanne Craig et al., Buffett to Invest $5 Billion in Goldman,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at Al (explaining the conditions behind Warren Buffet's
investment in Goldman Sachs).
16 See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Radical Shift for Goldman and Morgan,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at Al ("Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last big
independent investment banks on Wall Street, will transform themselves into bank
holding companies subject to far greater regulation.").
17 See Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2009
(describing the process by which AIG Financial Products sold the swaps); see also Car-
rick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real- World Test,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at Al ("AIG's credit-default-swaps operation was run out of
its AIG Financial Products Corp. unit.").
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AIG's bottom line.18 But the problem was that AIG's assump-
tions for their swap business did not properly account for a ma-
jor real estate market downturn and the potential for massive
payouts-which was exactly what happened in 2008.19 AIG was
like a casino that took bets but did not have the funds to pay
winners.
As the federal regulators examined the problem, they rea-
lized that AIG was the thin thread holding the financial system
back from the brink. "As Paulson and Bernanke both knew,
AIG had effectively become a linchpin of the global financial
system," and failure was not an option (p. 394). AIG reported
obligations on credit default swaps that were in excess of $300
billion in 2008 (p. 395). If AIG failed, the banks would be forced
to "mark down assets and raise billions of dollars-a frighten-
ing prospect in the current markets" (p. 395). Moreover, if AIG
failed, millions of average Americans, who purchased life and
health insurance policies with AIG, would also be adversely
affected. When President Bush was briefed on the issue he
posed a pedestrian yet profound question: "An insurance com-
pany does all this?" (p. 401).
After false starts with a private bailout, the Federal Re-
serve structured a historic $85 billion loan to AIG in exchange
for an 80% equity stake in the company. 20 The federal loan be-
nefited not only AIG, but the numerous investment banks that
had purchased the swaps since the loan made it possible for
AIG to pay its swap obligations.21 "More than a quarter of the
bailout funds left AIG immediately and went directly into the
18 See Mollenkamk, supra note 8 ("AIG became one of the largest sellers of credit-
default-swap protection ... [and flor years, the business was extremely lucrative.").
19 See id. ("AIG relied on ... models to help figure out which swap deals were safe.
But AIG didn't anticipate how market forces and contract terms not weighed by the
models would turn the swaps, over the short term, into huge financial liabilities.").
20 See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., US. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout;
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at Al ("Un-
der terms hammered out Tuesday night, the Fed will lend up to $85 billion to AIG, and
the U.S. government will effectively get a 79.9% equity stake in the insurer in the form
of warrants called equity participation notes.").
21 See, e.g., Mark Pittman, Goldman, Merrill Collect Billions After Fed's AIG Bai-
lout Loans, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 29, 2008 (describing how AIG used the loans that it
received from the Federal Reserve to meet collateral calls).
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accounts of global financial institutions like Goldman Sachs,
Merrill Lynch, and Deutsche Bank, which were owed the mon-
ey under the credit default swaps that AIG had sold them" (p.
532).22
Passing TARP and Bailing Out America
A day after the historic loan to AIG, Treasury Secretary
Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke met
with key legislators to propose a systemic stabilizing solution
in the form of a bailout bill in order to stem the spreading con-
tagion that was the toxic financial assets on the books of major
banks.23 The proposal came in the form of a $700 billion pro-
gram, now known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), that would give the Treasury Secretary great authori-
ty to buy troubled financial assets and take other actions ne-
cessary to stabilize the financial system. 24 At the meeting, Ber-
nanke made it gravely clear how much the country needed such
a program: "If we don't do this .. . we may not have an economy
on Monday." 25
According to Sorkin, the genesis of TARP was a then-five-
month-old document that Paulson had asked his deputies to
prepare in the event of a financial doomsday scenario (p. 419).
The document was entitled the 'Break the Glass' Bank Recapi-
talization Plan."26 The first draft of the TARP bill presented to
Congressional leaders was only three-pages long and gave the
Treasury Secretary unbridled authority for oversight and post-
hoc review (pp. 467-68).27 After much political posturing-after
22 See Richard Teitelbaum, Secret AIG Document Shows Goldman Sachs Minted
Most Toxic CDOs, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 23, 2010 ("Paris-based Societe Generale got the
biggest payout from AIG, or $16.5 billion, followed by Goldman Sachs, which got $14
billion, and then Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch.").
23 See Joe Nocera, As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2008, at Al.
24 See generally Summary of Financial Bailout Legislation, REUTERS, Sept. 28,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE48R48220080928.
25 Nocera, supra note 23.
26 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Source Document: Treasury's Confidential 'Break The
Glass'Plan, Nov. 29, 2008, available athttp://www.andrewrosssorkin.com/?p=368.
27 See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008.
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all, it was a presidential election year-a bill was brought to
the floor of the House of Representatives for a vote and it was
rejected. 28 "Stock prices plunged, with the Dow Jones Industri-
al Average tumbling 7 percent, or 777.68 points, its biggest
one-day point drop ever" (p. 499). After more political maneu-
vering, TARP was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Bush on October 3, 2008, giving the federal govern-
ment more tools and resources to deal with the financial cri-
sis. 29
Too Big to Fail ends with a dramatic secret meeting in
Washington where Paulson gathered the heads of the "Big 9"
Wall Street firms and strongly encouraged them, in unequivoc-
al terms, to sell tens of billions of dollars of preferred stock to
the U.S. Government in exchange for TARP money in order to
stabilize the system and avoid a second Great Depression (pp.
519-24). Some commentators compared the meeting to a "re-
verse holdup" because the banks were essentially forced to take
government bailout money. 30 While there was some initial re-
luctance to sign the agreements, the banks ultimately had no
choice, given the overwhelming pressure from their regulators.
After all nine banks signed the agreements, Paulson felt like
the country had "just crossed the Rubicon" (p. 528).
For most of the book, Sorkin does very little editorializing,
explaining, and forecasting. Like a good reporter, he focuses on
reporting the facts and events as they happened. However, in
the book's brief Epilogue, Sorkin does wonder aloud: "Could the
financial crisis have been avoided?" (p. 534); "[D]id the gov-
ernment's response mitigate it or make it worse?" (p. 534); and,
28 See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Rejects Bailout Package, 228-
205; Stocks Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Al ("In a moment of historic import
in the Capitol and on Wall Street, the House of Representatives voted on Monday to
reject a $700 billion rescue of the financial industry.").
29 See David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Rescue Bill After House Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al ("The House of Representatives gave final approval on Fri-
day to the $700 billion bailout for the financial system, reversing course to authorize
what may be the most expensive government intervention in history.").
30 See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Good Billions After Bad, VANITY
FAIR, Oct. 2009, at 204 (showing how bank executives were told to clear matters with
their boards and accept TARP money in the aftermath of a meeting with Secretary
Paulson).
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Did Lehman have to fail? (pp. 535-37). While he does not pro-
vide judgment or answers to these questions, he does acknowl-
edge that the financial system is in need of much reform and
that the events chronicled in Too Big to Fail need to be studied
for years to come to prevent similar calamities in the future
(pp. 538-39).
II. AN UNEXPLORED EXPLANATION IN A MESSIER MODEL
Too Big to Fail contains little in terms of thorough diagno-
sis or explanation of the crisis, as Sorkin states that the book's
purpose is to provide "the first detailed, moment-by-moment
account of one of the most calamitous times in our history" and
not necessarily to diagnose it (p. xii). While lacking in diagnos-
es and explanations, Sorkin's account offers diagnostic value
for scholars who are searching for root causes of the crisis,
much like a diligent fossil collector's find is to paleontologists
theorizing about the extinction of dinosaurs. One explanation
of the financial crisis, unexplored but insinuated in the book, is
the fallacy of the neoclassical economic model that is at the
foundation of our financial system. The financial crisis is in
some ways a tragic tale about blind faith in false parables
about perfectly efficient markets with uber-rational actors, and
the need for a better economic archetype to augment the exist-
ing paradigm.
A. The End of Everything (As We Know It)
The American economy, and particularly the financial in-
dustry, is built on an elegant neoclassical free market ideology
that is premised on rational actors and efficient markets. Prior
to the financial crisis, unbridled free market capitalism was
thought by many to be the superior, most evolved, economic
system that should be adopted by the world over. At the begin-
ning of Too Big to Fail, we hear this echoed by Sandy Weil, the
former CEO of Citigroup, shortly before the crisis: "The whole
world is moving to the American model of free enterprise and
capital markets" (p. 4). Faith in the free markets and its self-
corrective nature was strong and pervasive. Such fervent faith,
coupled with continuous economic growth, made deregulation
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the guiding regulatory principle of the last few decades. 31 Dere-
gulation, in part, made it possible for certain institutions to
become too big to fail, and it also sowed the seeds for many of
the financial crisis' poisonous fruits, such as dangerous short-
selling, over-leveraged banks, and unsupervised investment
banks.32 The thinking among many in government, industry,
and academia was: why regulate when markets self-correct?
After all, markets are smarter and more efficient than govern-
ment bureaucrats.33 That line of thinking changed for many
with the recent financial crisis, which brought the entire global
economic system to the verge of collapse.
In the aftermath of the crisis, and in search of answers,
many have begun to question our fundamental assumptions
and understandings about our economy and our financial mar-
kets. If free markets are self-correcting, then why did it need
over a trillion dollars worth of government bailouts to survive?
If investors are rational, why did so many invest in toxic as-
sets? In the wake of the crisis, both true believers and loyal
critics of our free market system have expressed their either
newly-founded or long-held doubts. Following the financial cri-
sis, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, an Ayn
Rand apologist and free market proselytizer, expressed his
"shock[" and "distress[]" upon discovering a flaw in the free
market ideology "that define[d] how the world works."34 Simi-
31 See, e.g., SARKIS J. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD FINANCIAL
MARKETS: MYTHS, REALITIES, AND IMPACT (1990); Eric Tymoigne, Securitization, Dere-
gulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis, Part I - The Evolution of Securitiza-
tion (Levy Econ. Inst. Of Bard College, Working Paper No. 573.1, 2009), available at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_573_- 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
32 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Trea-
sury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 782 (2009) ("[E]xcessive deregulation was
a principal cause of the 2008 financial crisis.").
33 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) ("Under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, the
'smart' money will set prices and through the process of arbitrage will swamp the in-
fluence of the poorly informed or foolish. Even the unsophisticated therefore can rely on
market efficiency to ensure that the price he pays for a security will be 'fair."'); see
generally A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time For Retirement? 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1073 (2005).
3 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. 36-37 (2008) (statement of
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larly, Richard Posner, the prominent federal judge, legal scho-
lar, and free-market ideologue from the University of Chicago,
also expressed his doubts about the coventional understand-
ings of American capitalism and our economy.35 Posner went so
far as to call himself a Keynesian now, 36 and call into question
the practical utility of the works of his colleagues from the
University of Chicago, the St. Peter's Cathedral of free market,
laissez-faire economics. 37 These new views from Greenspan,
Posner, and other purist free-market thinkers, amounted to
apostasy to true believers, and forced everyone to re-examine
the fundamental assumptions of our free market economic
model. Are free markets always self-correcting? Is deregulation
always the better alternative to government intervention? Are
individuals truly uber-rational actors?
B. A New and Messier Model
In light of the financial crisis, the long-cherished, elegant
free market economic model appeared inaccurate and inade-
quate. A new model, based on newly discovered understand-
ings, is needed to make sense of the mess that was the finan-
cial crisis. One of the central tenets of the elegant neoclassical
economic model is that individuals are wholly-rational and
uber-disciplined.3 8 In fact, much of financial regulation is pre-
Dr. Alan Greenspan), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/
20081024163819.pdf.
36 See Richard A. Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23,
2009 ("We have learned since September that the present generation of economists has
not figured out how the economy works."); see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY (2010).
36 See Posner, supra note 35 (saying that Keynes' views are still as relevant today
as they were when Keynes published them).
3 See John Cassidy, After the Blowup, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28 ("I
think the challenge is to the economics profession as a whole, but to Chicago most of
all.").
38 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14
(1976) ("[A]1I human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [(1)] maxim-
ize their utility [(2)] from a stable set of preferences and [(3)] accumulate an optimal
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets."); Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-79 (1998)
(discussing the perception of individuals in the standard model, and showing how
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mised on the reasonable investor as the homo economicus, the
rational man. 39 Creating policies for the rational man is easy-
give them access to all relevant information and all the possible
choices and they will make the utility maximizing choice.40 Yet
extraordinary financial crises and ordinary daily life tell us
that real individuals deviate greatly from their neoclassical
uber-rational brethren. Real people lack perfect self-control and
are not entirely logical, 41 and as a result, markets are not al-
ways perfectly efficient. A newer and messier model, premised
on real individuals, who are inherently flawed, has been gain-
ing prominence in the wake of the financial crisis.
Over the last few decades, a growing body of literature in
behavioral economics has provided a strong case against the
perfect rationality of individuals and the elegant efficient mar-
kets by placing greater emphasis on the messier human as-
pects of markets and their participants. For Richard Thaler,
the prominent University of Chicago behavioral economist, the
choice between neoclassical economics and behavioral econom-
ics is a "choice between being precisely wrong or vaguely
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest, causes people to
depart from the classical economic model).
3 See Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 99, 111 (2005) ("[M]any courts appear to view the reasonable investor as referring
to a normative idealized type of behavior, instead of a descriptive realistic depiction of
actual behavior."); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud:
Is the Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 297 (2009)
("Decisional law and the related literature support the view that the reasonable inves-
tor is a rational investor."); David A. Hoffman, The 'Duty" to be a Rational Sharehold-
er, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 545 (2006) ("Rational shareholders know what they want and
select it in the most efficient way available.") (emphasis omitted); see generally Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551
(1998).
40 See Richard H. Thaler, Mortgages Made Simpler, N.Y. TIMES. July 5, 2009, at 4;
see also Hoffman, supra note 39, at 560 (pointing out that the "[c]lassical theory asserts
that rational shareholders are presumptively able to evaluate the thousandth page in a
prospectus just as well as the first" and use that information to make a rational deci-
sion).
1 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 669 (1999) ("[I]ndividuals
often will be swayed by the force of their affective responses to events and decisions,
regardless of whether their rational, sequential, analytical system would opt for a
different course.").
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right."4 2 For Thaler, and others like him, the behavioral model
is messy "[b]ecause human nature is a mess."4 3  An explana-
tion for the financial crisis unexplored by Sorkin, in Too Big to
Fail, is the fundamental fallacy of the rational man assumption
lying at the heart of our financial model and economy. While
unexplored, Sorkin alludes to the notion that the root of the
crisis may be more anthropomorphic than technical, more a
failure of man than system. "[W]hether an institution-or the
entire system-is too big to fail has as much to do with the
people that run these firms and those that regulate them as it
does any policy or written rules" (p. 539). Behavioral econo-
mists have convincingly challenged the neoclassical tenet of the
rational actor by identifying certain cognitive limitations that
bind our rationality, such as mental biases, heuristics, and oth-
er irrational impetuses.
Three types of interrelated cognitive limitations are worth
noting in terms of the financial crisis: overconfidence, herd be-
havior, and cultural cognition. The meticulous narrative of Too
Big to Fail serves as a wonderful case study into irrational be-
havior and its severe consequences.
Overconfidence
Individuals generally have an overabundance of confi-
dence in their own abilities and an overabundance of optimism
in their futures, despite facts to the contrary. 44 The story of the
financial crisis is in many ways a story of hubris. It is a tale
about individuals who bought homes that they could not af-
42 JUSTIN Fox, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD,
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 298 (2009).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Di-
lemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("One of the most
robust findings in the psychology of prediction is that people's predictions tend to be
optimistically biased. By a number of metrics and across a variety of domains, people
have been found to assign higher probabilities to their attainment of desirable out-
comes than either objective criteria or logical analysis warrants."); see also Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (showing how individuals can be overcome by unrealistic
optimism).
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ford,45 bankers who thought that the market would only rise, 46
financial engineers who felt that they had mastered risk, and
regulators who believed that they had control over financial
risk.47 A financial crisis is often thought of as a crisis of confi-
dence-too little confidence. 48 But behavioral studies in eco-
nomics and psychology suggest that financial crisis may also be
caused by too much confidence, and that sometimes humility is
all that stands between stability and collapse.
Sorkin chronicles many instances of overconfidence on the
part of key players in Too Big to Fail. There was Hank Paulson
telling a Senate committee that if he was given temporary au-
thority and funding ("bazooka[s]") to help Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, then he may not have to use it, and Fannie and
Freddie would stabilize, and he knew this because "[he has]
been around [the] markets for a long time" (p. 200). Paulson, of
course, turned out to be wrong. Then there was the strange
15 See Richard A. Posner, Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A15 ("It cannot just be assumed that most people who
during the housing boom bought homes with adjustable-rate mortgages, or mortgages
with prepayment penalties, or mortgages that required a low or even no down pay-
ment, were fools or victims of fraud."); Bianna Golodryga, Do Homeowners Share
Blame for Mortgage Mess., ABC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2008 ("More Americans than ever have
become first-time homeowners in the last decade. It's become increasingly clear, how-
ever, that many of them couldn't keep up with home payments."); John Carney, 20
Year Old Buys Home With $183,000 FHA Loan And Just 3.5% Down, BUS. INSIDER,
Oct. 18, 2009 (giving an example of an overly optimistic homeowner).
46 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Fnancial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 12 (2010)
(testimony of Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Blankfein.pdff David
Ewing Duncan, A Crisis of Overconfidence, FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 2009 (stating that bank-
ers were not immune from the wave of overconfidence that preceded the financial col-
lapse); Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 24 (suggesting the
roots of the financial crisis were partially psychological and the result of bankers be-
lieving that the market would continue to rise).
17 See Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima & Jill Drew, What Went Wrong, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al (reporting on the failure of regulators to curb financial risk);
see also PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 5 (1999), available at
http://www.ustreas.govipress/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
48 See Jonathan Alter, America's New Shrink, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2009, at 19
("Too much confidence makes people and nations hubristic, while those on the receiving
end feel conned. Too little confidence breeds timidity and uncertainty, which can be
fatal.").
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case of Dick Fuld, who despite overwhelming facts to the con-
trary, still believed that his company was salvageable at a
premium to its market price. This overconfidence in his firm,
and his own abilities, led him to inexplicably destroy a deal
with the Korean Development Bank at the eleventh hour that
may have saved his beloved Lehman empire (pp. 215-16).
Herd Behavior
Herd behavior exists when people behave in a certain way
simply because many other people are acting and thinking si-
milarly.49 The gravitational pull of the herd can lead individu-
als to make irrational decisions. In the financial context, herd
behavior can result in stock market bubbles and crashes, as
well as bank runs.50
During the financial crisis, there were many examples of
herd behavior and its effects. Burgeoning investments in real
estate by many led many others, for no rational reason, to in-
vest in real estate, leading to a domestic real estate market
bubble, which in turn led to a collapse in the mortgage securi-
ties market that was heavily invested in by investment banks.
As a result, both weak and healthy financial institutions felt
the thundering of the irrational herd, as every major bank in
America tried to steel itself for the stampede. The herd mental-
ity, as detailed in Too Big to Fail, was also evident in short sel-
lers of bank stocks (pp. 81, 201), runs on the banks (pp. 10, 82),
and efforts by regulators to minimize their impact. Herd beha-
vior also reared its head in executive suites where some senior
officers foresaw a looming crisis, yet did not take prudent ac-
tion to swim against the tide. Chuck Prince, the then CEO of
Citigroup, infamously said: "When the music stops, in terms of
4 See generally ROBERT R. PRECHTER, JR., THE WAVE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF SOCIONOMICs 152-53 (1999); see also Abhijit V.
Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. EcON. 797, 798 (1992) (herd
behavior involves "everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even when their private
information suggests doing something quite different"); Laurens Rook, An Economic
Psychological Approach to Herd Behavior, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 75, 75 (2006) (showing
how herd behavior influences individual behavior).
5o See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 149-53 (2000) (describing
how crowd behavior can potentially have an effect on market dynamics).
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liquidity, things will be complicated, . . . [blut as long as the
music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still
dancing."51 Prince meant that so long as everyone else was
making money off dangerously risky behavior, his firm was
going to do the same.
Cultural Cognition
Based on a growing body of studies and literature, indi-
viduals tend "to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of
fact . . . to values that define their cultural identities."5 2 This
tendency is known as cultural cognition.53 In the run up and
aftermath of the financial crisis, many public officials have
railed against a seedy and avaricious "wall street culture" for
bringing down the global economy. If there is a "wall street cul-
ture," then recent cultural cognition studies would imply that
some of the irrational, suboptimal decisions made by key play-
ers during the crisis may not be completely attributable to ava-
rice alone, but can, in part, be attributable to a cognitive over-
identification with that culture and its values.54 Too Big to Fail
highlights many instances of the incestuous nature of the fi-
nancial industry.55 The regulators and the regulated often
came from and traveled in the same circles.56 Divergent back-
grounds and dissenting views were often few and far between.
s1 Rhys Blakely, Should Chuck Prince go from Citigroup? The Web's Verdict, TIMES
ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http:/Ibusiness.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ind
ustry-sectors/banking-and-finance/article2573692.ece.
52 Yale Law School, The Cultural Cognition Project (including such matters of fact
as "whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty deters mur-
der; whether gun control makes society more safe or less"), available at http://cultural
cognition.net (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
63 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) ("[W]hat citizens believe about . . . empirical
consequences . .. derives from their cultural worldviews.").
54 See generally KAREN Ho, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET
(2009) (exploring the belief systems and structure of the American financial industry).
55 P. 437 (highlighting the close ties of key players to Goldman Sachs).
56 See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 94 (2010) (identifying high level government
officials during the financial crisis who were former Wall Street executives); OpenSe-
crets.org, Report: Revolving Door Spins Quickly Between Congress, Wall Street (June
3, 2010), http://opensecrets.org/news/2010/06/report-revolving-door-spins-quickly.html.
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This absence of diverse and dissenting voices perhaps made
signs of a calamitous crisis harder to identify and accept.5 7
Some critics have even suggested that Too Big to Fail may
be an inaccurate account of the crisis because Sorkin is too
close to his sources to be objective.58 At his book party, the at-
tendees included Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JP Morgan, John
Mack, the then CEO of Morgan Stanley, hedge fund titan Ken
Griffin of Citadel and other top echelon Wall Street players.59
The behavioral perspective of the financial crisis by no
means excuses the poor, and often times troubling, decisions
made by key players; instead, the behavioral perspective offers
a possible explanation for how we came so close to the brink of
collapse. Sorkin was right when he wrote that, "this drama is a
human one, a tale about the fallibility of people who thought
they themselves were too big to fail" (p. 7). Too Big to Fail may
ultimately prove to be a tale about people who were too (cogni-
tively) blind to see.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it may take years or even decades for journal-
ists, legislators, regulators, and scholars to truly unravel and
fully comprehend the causes of the financial crisis. While beha-
vioral economics may be gaining prominence in the wake of the
financial crisis, as we re-examine our current models and un-
derstandings, widespread policy acceptance and application of
its tenets will likely, and rightfully so, take more time and
study. To that end, Sorkin's reporting and narrative in Too Big
to Fail is of great utility because it serves as a good first draft
of history for those studying the failures of our economic sys-
tem and exploring possible explanations.
5' CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING To EXTREMES 85-93 (2009) (discussing how discussions
of like-minded individuals can lead to extremism and group polarization).
58 See Sherman, supra note 6 ("At bottom, [Sorkin's critics] see him as far too cozy
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BONDING JUSTICE
THE BOND. By George Fletcher. Hart Publishing. 2009. Pp.
295. $17.95 (cloth).
Reviewed by Robert Steinbuch'
INTRODUCTION
George Fletcher is a preeminent law professor at an Ivy-
League law school.' His scholarly writings have garnered sig-
nificant acclaim among academics and practitioners in the le-
gal field. 2 But outside of the often mis-labeled "academy,"
Fletcher's writings are likely not as broadly known. That might
change with his first foray into fiction.
Fletcher has written an exciting and entertaining novel-
The Bond (Hart Publishing 2009)-along the lines of popular
legal fiction pieces such as One L: The Turbulent True Story of
a First Year at Harvard Law School (1977)3 and The Firm
(1993). But The Bond is indeed quite more, as well.
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen
School of Law. Former Counsel to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. J.D.
from, and John M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow at, Columbia Law School. B.A. and
M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania. Commissioner on the Arkansas Commission
for Newborn Umbilical Cord Blood Bank Initiative. The author wishes to thank Profes-
sors Pearl Steinbuch, Frances Fendler, and Nicholas Kahn-Fogel for their guidance,
input, and/or contributions. The author also wishes to thank Philip Levy, Eric Schief-
fer, and the other outstanding members of the Mississippi Law Journal for their excel-
lent work. The University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law
provides summer stipends to assist research such as this article.
I See http://www.law.columbia.edulfac/George-Fletcher (last visited May 16,
2010).
2 Id.
3I realize that Turow claims that ONE L is a memoir, but its level of hyperbole
belies that claim.
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While The Bond overall is fiction, the themes undoubtedly
are real-as are some of the specific events themselves. Fletch-
er has wonderfully and seamlessly woven together a love story,
an analysis of the theoretical and intellectual complexities of
law (far too often overlooked by lawyers, judges, and academics
alike), an exploration of academic politics, and a brief history of
select nineteenth century radical reformers. All four of these
themes are interesting and exciting in their own right.
GROSSLY OPTIMISTIC
Fletcher tells his story through Adam Gross, an idealistic,
yet slightly jaundiced, law professor who far more accurately
depicts law professors than Turow's exaggerated and one-
dimensional Kingsfield. Gross loves teaching, has a genuine
admiration for his students (albeit in a marginally avuncular
fashion), and struggles with, well, everything. He is a complex
character, who is torn by his own strongly-held beliefs-and,
ultimately, his own identity. This personal conflict drives Gross
to seek both truth and justice in his own limited way through
the process of teaching itself.
Here Fletcher particularly distinguishes The Bond from
One L. One L was written from the perspective of a law stu-
dent. The professors, therefore, were all but forced to become
caricatures given the prism though which they were viewed.
The opposite is true in The Bond And, in fact, here Fletcher
also separates himself from Gross. If Fletcher ever had the
naive optimism of Gross, it has since matured into a realism
inevitable with age and experience.
The context of the book-law school-presents a particu-
larly opportune pallet for compelling story development, as it,
like the law that it analyzes, is rife with drama, conflict, and
resolution. This setting allows Fletcher to present the most en-
lightening aspect of The Bond to the lay reader-how legal
academics develop legal analysis in the classroom and beyond.
The Bond offers the core concepts of law school in a fashion
both accessible and interesting to the intelligent non-lawyer
and lawyer alike. This is no easy task. Legal novels too often
rely on curiosities in the law that on the surface appear enligh-
tening, but in reality are insignificant. Other books in this ge-
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nre focus mostly on the emotional conflicts of the legal or law-
school process (recall Turow) rather than substance-on the
apparent belief that the latter does not provide for an interest-
ing narrative. Fletcher debunks this approach in The Bond,
focusing exactly on truly difficult questions in the law in the
context of an engaging personal story.
ONE KILLING OR Two
In The Bond Fletcher delves head on into the question of
how the law should and hesitantly does address abortion when
viewed alongside of pre-natal infanticide. Fletcher himself of-
ten has encouraged this discourse in his own classes. In The
Bond, to the chagrin of his politically-correct colleagues more
concerned with pursuing personal and political agendas than
enlightenment and edification, Gross initiates a discussion of
the legal consequences of killing a pregnant woman and what
she is carrying in her womb (obscuring language intended). The
conversation in Gross's legal philosophy class resulted in one
student asserting that what a pregnant mother carries is
equivalent to a tumor or an appendix in the student's superfi-
cial attempt to by-pass the philosophical challenge that Gross
presented. But Gross sees this for the sleight-of-hand that it is.
Indeed, Gross focuses on the most difficult question in the
abortion/life debate-and one that I witnessed first-hand when
I worked on the Judiciary Committee in the U.S. Senate-
whether when somebody kills a pregnant woman, he is guilty of
two murders or just one. In 2004, Congress criminalized as
homicide the killing of an unborn child when a pregnant wom-
an is attacked. 4 While opponents of this bill wanted to prevent
assaults on the fetus, they refused to recognize any kill-
4 Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 & 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2006)). For a broader discussion of these
issues, see Robert Steinbuch, The Butterfly Effect ofPolitics over Principle: The Debate
over the Unborn Victims of Violence Act and the Motherhood Protection Act, 12
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 223 (2009).
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ing/death of the baby/fetus whatsoever.5 That is, like the self-
assured law student in The Bond, these groups argued essen-
tially that what a pregnant mother carries is equivalent to a
tumor or an appendix. But, as the Hasidic student in Gross's
class recognized, the issue is far more complicated. According
to his dogma, "[although a]ccording to the Talmud, the fetus
becomes a person when the head crowns, . . . the fetus is worth
something, even if it is not yet a full person" (pp. 214-15). A
contrasting position was offered by Gross's student Jaime Sul-
livan, the secularized former Catholic Priest, who continues to
struggle with his identity and convictions. He presented a view
that life begins only at the "quickening" (p. 49). He recognizes
that this is perhaps an arbitrary line, but one that created the
same consequences for actions toward the fetus regardless of
the actor. While Fletcher's characters engage in a nuanced
evaluation of the complexities of this legal, political, moral, and
religious issue, most of this analysis was ignored in the actual
debate in Congress. For sure, there were moments when the
complexities of the issue were broached, but for the most part,
the essential questions were left unaddressed.
In fact, Fletcher delves into the nuances of the issue by
having Gross discuss with his class an exam question in which
an expectant mother is attacked by a cult member intent on
killing the woman's unborn fetus. The twist is that the mother
was on her way to have an abortion and winds up thanking her
attacker. So the question is whether the attacker is guilty of a
crime when he not only did what the mother wanted, but, in
fact, had his actions ratified by her.
Unlike the Congressional debate, Fletcher-through
Gross-begins to tackle the vexing problem of how we need to
conceptualize this legal conundrum. Indeed, he addresses this
challenge not with linguistic legerdemain or political prattle,
but through real, thoughtful, and reasoned analysis. And he
does so through the Socratic method characteristic of law-
school education. As such, Gross pushes his class-and ulti-
5 See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, "UNBORN VICTIMS" ACT DOES
NOTHING TO DETER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.now.org/issues/legislat/200
305.html#unborn (last visited May 16, 2010).
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mately The Bonds readers-toward self-enlightenment. That is
not to say that Fletcher thrusts any one position on his readers.
The Bond is neither Pro-Life nor Pro-Choice. It does, however,
cause readers to analyze their beliefs with more rigor than I
suspect many have done in the past.
WE DON'T Do "DUE PROCESS"
For Gross this process of illumination comes with a high
cost. Gross is assaulted by so-called colleagues with a differing
political and social agenda for engaging in this intriguing ex-
amination of abortion and infanticide that contradicts the ac-
cepted dogma of legal academia. They happily trample Gross's
individual rights, in a blatant power grab, during a process de-
signed to topple the Dean and marginalize Gross. As they at-
tack him with anonymous accusations, without affording him
any opportunity to confront his accusers, Gross's opponents
readily admit that the law that they teach and preach does not
apply to their own actions: "Anyway, here within our [law
school] community we do not operate like the courts. We prefer
informal procedures. There's no need for the guarantees of due
process" (p. 169).
Indeed, this lack of fidelity to established principles of eq-
uity is a growing problem in higher education. For example, the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) though-
tfully describes this phenomenon in the context of the abating
of objective criteria for promotion and tenure and the concomi-
tant rise of the illegitimate requirement of political and social
conformity with entrenched institutional power brokers:
In evaluating faculty members for promotion, renewal,
tenure, and other purposes . . . universities have customarily
examined faculty performance in the three areas of teaching,
scholarship, and service . . . . [T]he[se] terms are themselves
generally understood to describe the key functions performed
by faculty members.
In recent years, [the AAUP] has become aware of an in-
creasing tendency on the part not only of administrations and
governing boards but also of faculty members serving in such
roles as department chairs or as members of promotion and
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tenure committees to add a fourth criterion in faculty evalua-
tion: "collegiality."
... [This] poses several dangers.... [This] exclude[s] per-
sons on the basis of their difference from a perceived norm...
. [Clollegiality may be confused with the expectation that a
faculty member. . . display an excessive deference to adminis-
trative or faculty decisions ....
... [It also] chill[s] faculty debate and discussion. Criti-
cism and opposition do not necessarily conflict with collegiali-
ty. Gadflies, critics of institutional practices or collegial
norms, even the occasional malcontent, have all been known
to play an invaluable and constructive role in the life of aca-
demic departments and institutions. They have sometimes
proved collegial in the deepest and truest sense. Certainly a
college or university replete with genial Babbitts is not the
place to which society is likely to look for leadership. . . . The
very real potential for a distinct criterion of "collegiality" to
cast a pall of stale uniformity places it in direct tension with
the value of faculty diversity in all its contemporary manife-
stations.6
As such, the AAUP well recognizes the importance of intel-
lectual diversity amongst faculty rather than its flaccid substi-
tute-identity politics.
THE STAIN OF IDENTITY POLITICS
In The Bond, Fletcher takes on identity politics, ridiculing
the paternalistic claim by the two antagonist feminist faculty
members at the fictional Regina Law School that female stu-
dents in Gross's class comparing pre-natal homicide with legal
abortion were in particular need of a grade adjustment due to
their gender-to compensate them for the "difficulty" they
might have had in handling the exam question reflecting the
6 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ON COLLEGIALITY AS A
CRITERION FOR FACULTY EVALUATIONS, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/
contents/collegiality.htm (last visited May 16, 2010).
[VOL. 80: 1382
HeinOnline  -- 80 Miss. L.J. 382 2010
Bonding Justice
violent murder of a mother's unborn fetus/child. The notion
that such an exam question would engender the ire of the polit-
ically correct Gedankenpolizei might seem the absurd province
of exaggerated, and perhaps trite, fiction. Not so. Fletcher him-
self suffered similar indignation when the then-Dean of Co-
lumbia Law School, David Leebron, threatened Fletcher due to
his inclusion of an almost identical question on his own crimi-
nal law exam.7
As law professors, both Gross and Fletcher eschew incon-
sistent positions. Indeed, law professors routinely distinguish
law from its baser cousin politics on the ground that the former
must have unifying and overriding principles. Conflicting posi-
tions in the law, therefore, chip away at its legitimacy and un-
dermine the stature of those who teach and practice in it. Thus,
Gross revels when his attackers do exactly that. The Bonds
antagonists suffer from the incompatible beliefs that while
women are undoubtedly entitled to equal rights, those in
Gross's class singularly should be viewed as inherently too de-
licate to be able to rationally handle his (and Fletcher's) writ-
ten exam question. Thus, as Fletcher puts it, when the two at-
tacking professors present their indictment of Gross, he "began
to glimpse the twilight zone between reason and slapstick" (p.
33). I suspect Fletcher felt the same, notwithstanding that he
was forced to endure this maelstrom of political correctness.
Gross fares well enough also.
In this regard, The Bond is reminiscent of Philip Roth's
The Human Stain (2003). Roth's story itself is a reflection of
the life of Anatole Broyard, who, like the protagonist Coleman
Silk, was a light-skinned African American who years prior
passed himself off as white in order to avoid racism. Ironically,
Silk, a classics professor, is falsely accused of being a racist, but
7 See Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Academic Freedom under
Assault at Columbia Law School; Dean Threatens Criminal Law Professor, Oct. 4,
2000, http://www.thefire.org/article/130.html (last visited May 16, 2010). Leebron has
gone on to become President of Rice University. See http://www.professor.rice.edulprofe
ssor/President'sBio.asp?SnID=1387887652 (last visited May 16, 2010). Leebron later
readily endorsed the application of notions of "openness and rigid adherence to academ-
ic freedom" to others. Scott Jaschik, A Pentagon Olive Branch to Academe, INSIDE
HIGHER ED., Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/04/16/minerva.
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is precluded by the past that he never disclosed from using his
own story to demonstrate the folly of the charges. Although
Fletcher's narrative is far different than Roth's, the reader is
left with very much the same sense of despair regarding this
aspect of contemporary academia (and perhaps society) after
having read (and lived through) both stories.8
Indeed, The Bond has some broader similarity to Roth's
parable in that both focus on this persistent issue in the con-
text of a love story (albeit the details of each could not be any
more dissimilar), both have a recurring reflection on historical
events outside the scope of the characters, and both employ
feminist professors as the antagonists. In The Bond, however,
the love interest is a sophisticated and intelligent colleague
(the Dean's wife, in fact) who engages in her affair at the ex-
pense of her sometimes horn-adorning, slightly-superior (in
credentials and attitude) cuckold. In The Human Stain, the
paramour, Faunia Farley, is of a different age, status and intel-
ligence than Silk, although similarly statured to her continual-
ly-jealous ex-husband, Lester.
NOT So SIGNIFICANT OTHERS AND OTHER INDIGNITIES
Fletcher further insightfully criticizes legal academia's
lack of consistent fidelity to due process when he describes the
hiring by Regina Law School of what is not-so-euphemistically
referred to in the academy as the "trailing spouse" of a faculty
applicant. In The Bond, Regina hired the Dean's less signifi-
cant other-that is, his trailing spouse-in order to secure the
more qualified former. I never fully understood the import of
this not-so-uncommon practice until one dean, in response to
my inquiry about whether a trailing spouse of a particular can-
didate was of the same quality as the "principal," exclaimed
rhetorically: "Are they ever?" Could you imagine suggesting in
corporate America that accepting a position would be contin-
gent on the contemporaneous hiring of a spouse or other com-
8 For a further discussion of these issues see Robert Steinbuch, Racist, 25 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 199 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsBy
Auth.cfm?perid=625512.
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panion? But in legal academia, this is just one of several exam-
ples of unprincipled hiring practices: political ideologies have
colored employment decisions; objective criteria of quality have
been discounted due to favoritism, cronyism, nepotism, and
hiring someone with whom an official is sleeping; and accepted
notions of conflict-of-interest recusal have been abused or com-
pletely ignored by critical players in the hiring process, to
name a few.9
9 For further discussion of identity and academic politics in actual practice see
Richard J. Peltz, From the Ivory Tower to the Glass House: Access to De-Identiled
Public University Admission Records to Study Affirmative Action, 25 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 185 n.23 (2009) (discussing a "Memorandum from Professor[,
and Acting Associate Dean,] Lynn C. Foster, William H. Bowen School of Law, Univer-
sity of Arkansas at Little Rock, to Acting Dean John M.A. DiPippa, William H. Bowen
School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock (undated)," which stated that
individuals with a certain political/philosophical preference should be excluded from a
committee assignment). The committee-assignment memorandum also focused on
demographic status of faculty under consideration for committee assignments: "there is
only one person [from a particular demographic], although [name redacted] is a [mem-
ber of a particular demographic] . . . [Also, i]t would be nice to have a [member of a
particular demographic]." (Committee-Assignment Memorandum, on file with author).
The brazenly exchanged notion that political/philosophical preference should be the
basis for administrators to unilaterally exclude faculty from membership on important
decision-making bodies is particularly troubling and hypocritical given that academics
and others routinely proclaim that the personal views of judicial nominees on issues
such as abortion should not be disqualifying. See, e.g., Michael Saul, Supreme Court
Nominee Sonia Sotomayor 'Open,' Will Follow Law on Abortion Issue, Says Friend,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 29, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/05/
29/2009-05-29_supreme court.html ("[Supreme Court Nominee Sonya Sotomayor] will
follow what she thinks is the law on that, and her personal beliefs will not interfere
with that analysis because my view of her is that she does not allow her personal be-
liefs to interfere with her analysis of legal issues."). Similarly, the Missouri Chief Jus-
tice, Michael A. Wolff, writes on the Court's official webpage:
Court opinions are not personal beliefs. Supreme Court opinions are directed
at one result: resolving a legal dispute. They do not necessarily reflect any
judge's personal views about the subject matter, nor are they pronounce-
ments of political policy. A review of the Court's opinions would show that de-
cisions are based on laws enacted by the General Assembly, previous court
decisions, court rules, constitutional provisions or other guiding legal author-
ity. Different judges may differ on what a legal provision means or what legal
principle controls a case. An individual judge may write a separate opinion
dissenting or concurring with the opinion of the Court; there you may find an
expression of one judge's individual views about what a legal provision means
or what legal principle should control.
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Perhaps Fletcher and I naively single out hiring in legal
academia for scolding in the context of broader unfair employ-
ment practices still found elsewhere in society, but such beha-
vior in law schools (even though, thankfully, far from univer-
sal) puts these actions in painful contradiction to the catechism
from which we as educators (of law, no less) preach, i.e., that
decisions will be made primarily based upon considerations of
merit. I nonetheless still hold onto the belief that for the most
part faculty hiring is a merit-based system. Indeed, Fletcher
and I have been fortunate enough to secure wonderful positions
through the existing system. But, like the antiquated approach
to collegiate admissions of "legacy" credit (read: favoritism) still
employed at some institutions, it is time to bury certain facul-
ty-hiring practices that unfortunately still crowd out considera-
tions of excellence.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers tend more than most to veer into attempts at lite-
rature. They do so, I believe, because the nature of the vocation
calls for a facility with language. Regrettably, these attempts
produce mixed results. But when one abled advocate is able to
combine this skill with a unique and compelling story, the re-
sult is refreshing. Fletcher offers us exactly that stimulation in
The Bond. His behind-the-scenes look into the operation of law
schools in the greater context of political and moral struggles
takes complex issues and presents them in accessible prose.
Judges, as other citizens, have personal beliefs. When citizens come to courts
to serve as jurors, we instruct them to set aside their persons [sic] beliefs and
decide cases based on the law and the facts. The same is true for judges, who
take an oath to do just that.
Michael A. Wolff, Law Matters: What Do Judges Believe . . . Really., Feb. 27, 2006,
http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1080. All this is not to say that personal beliefs
don't shape the evaluative process. They do. See generally, e.g., Theodore A. McKee,
Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007); Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical
Analysis of the Influence of Political Party Affiliation on Reversal Rates in the Eighth
Circuit for 2008, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 51, 64-65 (2009). However, as McKee indicates,
this is something to be embraced, not used as a basis for exclusion. Cf McKee, supra,
at 1723-24.
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The Bond is a must read for anyone interested in law and jus-
tice. It is a singular piece of literature deserving of both aca-
demic and popular attention.
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